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1WHAT IS READING IN THE PRACTICES OF LAW? 
Kirk W. Junker
Abstract:  
Law professors offer to teach students something called “thinking like a lawyer.”  They 
suggest thereby that legal thought is in some way unique.  If it is, through what means is 
it acquired?  By reading the law.  And so reading the law must be a different experience 
than reading other things, as is implied by the admonition that thinking like a lawyer is 
somehow different than other thinking.  In most law school education, reading is 
practiced as a means to an end—to produce a description of the substance or procedure of 
a particular area of the law.  Too often, it is only in legal research and writing courses that 
reading is explicitly addressed.  Even there, it is most often analyzed only in its role as a 
counterpart to the goal of writing; of producing tangible text.  But although reading is not 
studied on its own terms, it makes up most of the practice of learning the law and much 
of the practice of law.  When we read in the utilitarian senses of describing substance or 
procedure or in order to learn to write, we omit the powerful, tacit learning that occurs 
with this reading—the learning of the legal worldview.  This remains true in the practice 
of law as well, where reading maintains the acquired worldview.  This article explores 
how that worldview seeps silently into the lives of lawyers while they are busy learning 
to describe and inscribe the law.  While social science has much to tell us about the 
process of reading, we need to turn to the arts to see the worldview that is learned and 
perpetuated when one learns to read the law. 
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2I. The Occasion—Reading Has a History 
 
Alberto Manguel allows Robert Darnton to begin A History of Reading by 
reminding us that “reading has a history.”1 We may need to be reminded of this because, 
as Friedrich Nietzsche announced, forgetting may well be a survival device for the human 
animal.2 That may explain how we all forget the difficult process of having learned to 
read at all for the first time.3 Darnton’s observation that reading has a history does help 
us to realize that reading is not only in the context of cultural history, but in the context of 
personal history, and in the contexts of religion, race, geography and gender, as well. 
Therefore “when?” “where?” “how?” and now “why?” are questions that should be asked 
of reading.  The questions can be answered in part through observation and analysis.  But 
we also need theory building. 
“What is reading in the practices of law?” may sound initially like a peculiar 
question.  “How does one read the law?” would likely sound more common, and in an 
age of scientific evidence, of course it is.  But “how?”—the epistemological question—is 
not mine.  My question is “What is?”—a more ontological question.4 In its Educating 
Lawyers report, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching introduced 
seven recommendations for legal education by noting that “legal education needs to be 
 
1 Robert Darnton, What Is the History of Books?, in THE KISS OF LAMOURETTE, (Robert Darnton ed.,1990) 
(quoted in ROBERTO MANGUEL, A HISTORY OF READING 1 (1996)). 
2 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE OF HISTORY FOR LIFE, transl. Peter 
Preuss (Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1980). 
3 If in fact we have learned to read at all—“Grades Rise but Reading Skills Do Not” announced the New 
York Times recently. “The National Assessment of Educational Progress, an exam commonly known as the 
nation’s report card, found that the reading skills of 12th graders tested in 2005 were significantly worse 
than in 1992, when a comparable test was given, and essentially flat since students previously took the 
exam in 2002.” The cause(s) assigned to this trend “may become clearer in the future.” Diana Jean Schemo, 
Grades Rise but Reading Skills Do Not, New York Times, February 23, 2007, at A13. 
4 Of course, it must be admitted that the word “how,” alone, is not determinative.  Mortimer Adler’s 
famous How to Read a Book is not a book of technique only, although teasing and responsive detractors in 
some ways were:  “How to Read Two Books,” and “How to Read a Page,” for example. ..” MORTIMER 
ADLER AND CHARLES VAN DOREN, HOW TO READ A BOOK 
3responsive to both the needs of our time and recent knowledge about how learning takes 
place . . ..”5 When one considers that legal education demands that a student read 
thousands of pages of text, we clearly ought to be responsive to recent learning about 
how legal reading takes place.  The latest Carnegie Foundation Report contextualizes 
legal education by noting that if legal education were serious about serving clients and a 
solid ethical grounding, then in pursuit of such a goal, law schools could also benefit 
from, among other things, “research on learning.”6 Reading practices used by students in 
reading the law infrequently make use of that which the natural sciences, social sciences 
or the arts can tell us about reading. “The case-dialogue method drills students, over and 
over, in first abstracting from natural texts, then operating upon the ‘facts’ so abstracted 
according to specified rules and procedures, and drawing conclusions based upon that 
meaning.”7 In legal education, when we teach legal research and writing, we treat the 
research—that is, the reading—as though it is only prolegomena to the writing.  “In 
general, law school professors do not consider reading to be an important variable 
contributing to differences in law school performance”8
In legal practice—especially when it comes to billable hours—too often we 
maintain that attitude when we emphasize speaking and writing and treat reading the 
documents produced in discovery or the contract draft or the brief of a party opponent as 
somehow less productive time than time spent writing.  This might be explainable 
because of the demonstrable nature of work product that is the written text.  Likewise 
 
5 William Sullivan, et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law, The Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2007, at 8. 
6 Id. at 4. 
7 Id. at 6. 
8 Dorothy H. Deegan, Exploring Individual Differences Among Novices Reading in a Specific Domain: The 
Case of Law, 30 Reading Res. Z. 154, 157-58 (1995). 
4legal academics get tenure and recognition for what we have written, not for what we 
have read. 
By treating reading this way in legal education, we tacitly suggest not only that 
the reading that one does in legal practice has utilitarian value only, but also that it is an 
already-known skill.  If it is a skill already known, where does the student learn it?  
Undergraduate reading practices,9 reading the newspaper,10 e-mail correspondence, blogs, 
web-sites,11 novels,12 and magazines.  Yet, “[t]here is no doubt that reading the law, 
indeed reading any novel discourse, provides challenges [to the reader] previously unmet.  
This is all the more reason to allow challenges to be made public. . . .  Keeping the 
subject of reading closed at the level of higher education [might suggest that] there is 
nothing worth talking about.”13 It would seem absurd, would it not, to suggest that one 
could read a work in philosophy with the same practices that one reads e-mail 
correspondence from friends?  Likewise, a person knowledgeable about statistics would 
read a statistics text using different processes than someone who does not have a 
background in statistics.14 So why should we assume differently for reading the law?  
Legal texts too, are different.  "Legal texts can be considered a genre, and success with 
 
9 Education scholar Peter Dewitz points out that “Even after four years of undergraduate education, often 
from distinguished universities and brandishing strong grade point averages and high LSAT scores, first 
year law students are [reading] novices.” Peter Dewitz, Reading Law:  Three Suggestions for Legal 
Education, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 661 (1995-1996) 
10 Marshall McLuhan is often quoted as having said that we do not read the newspaper, but rather slip into 
it like a warm bath (although none of the sources consulted have cited where or when he said it.) 
11 Nicholas C. Burbules, Rhetorics of the Web: Hyperreading and Critical Literacy, PAGE TO SCREEN:
TAKING LITERACY INTO THE ELECTRONIC ERA 102 (Ilana Snyder ed., 1998). 
12 Mortimer Adler called the difference that between “expository” and “imaginative” literature, and said 
“Expository books try to convey knowledge . . .. Imaginative ones try to communicate an experience itself . 
. ..” Adler, supra, 205. 
13 Deegan, supra note 8, at 168. 
14 MICHAEL PRESSLEY & PETER AFFLERBACH, VERBAL PROTOCOLS OF READING: THE NATURE OF 
CONSTRUCTIVELY RESPONSIVE READING 12 (Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, 1995). 
5legal texts is based upon some general reading skills, as well as specific knowledge of 
that genre.”15 
"A common-sense notion that most educated adults generally read the same way 
pervades both lay and professional communities, despite clear evidence that differences 
in reading achievement levels increase with years of schooling.”16 This is in fact how 
education turns novices into experts.  In the social scientific studies of reading, all sorts 
of educational distinctions cascade from the distinction of reading novices from reading 
experts.  When it comes to the study of reading, researchers make clear distinctions 
between the reading practices of novices and experts in any given field.   
Even within the law, reading practices differ among substantive areas of the law.  
“The process of reading differs depending on what you are reading.  Reading contracts, 
most would concede, is not quite like reading anything else.”17 Furthermore, it is not just 
the genre that changes reading as we shift from other areas outside of the law to reading 
inside the law, or as we change from one substantive area of the law to another.  The 
medium also greatly affects our reading:  “The pragmatics of reading [on the web]—the 
speed of our reading, when we pause, how long we can concentrate, how often we skip 
over material or jump back and reread what we have read before, and so forth—are 
clearly going to be different, and these differences affect how we interpret, understand, 
and remember what we read.”18 Thus, when it comes to reading the law, a field of study 
 
15 Dewitz, supra note 9, at 657 (citing James F. Stratman, The Emergence of Legal Composition as a Field 
of Inquiry: Evaluating the Prospects, 60 Rev. Educ. Res. 153 n. 1 (1990)). 
16 Dorothy H. Deegan, supra note 8, at 154 (citing M.A. JUST & P.A. CARPENTER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
READING AND LANGAUGE COMPREHENSION (1987); J.I. GOODLAD, SCHOOL, CURRICULUM AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL (1966)). 
17 Scott J. Burnham, Critical Reading of Contracts, 23 Legal Stud. F. 391, 391 (1999). 
18 Burbules, supra note 11, at 102 (citing B.C. Bruce, Twenty-first Century Literacy, Technical Report No. 
624, Center for the Study of Reading, University of Illinois, Urbana/Champaign, (1995).  Marshall 
6and profession in which the very substance is words, we dare not dance lightly over what 
new or different reading practices are required, only to get right to the production of our 
own texts.   
Returning to Darnton’s opening, to say that reading has a history is to say that 
learning to read and the practices of reading have contexts, one of which is history, both 
for entire cultures and for individuals; for law and for lawyers.  The goal of this text is to 
explore what it is to learn to read the law—however implicitly—and what it is to 
continue to read the law; the ramifications of those practices, and what might be gained 
or lost if we change our reading practices.  Should the reader be persuaded that the gains 
outweigh the losses, it will remain for the reader to determine how to change our reading.  
All of this here is just to identify the occasion for examining legal reading practices. 
Does one study reading as a natural science, a social science or an art?  A survey 
of the amount of research conducted would suggest that most often, reading has been 
studied as a social science.  Before reviewing what social science offers, one might 
mention natural science considerations, although that is not the focus of this article. 
 
II. Reading, As Understood Through Natural Sciences 
In 1908, Edmund B. Huey “suggested that the human achievement of reading has 
few if any equals.19 Our capacity to read can, in some sense, surely be considered as an 
animal function.  In opposition to those who would distinguish the human from other 
 
McLuhan famously addressed this phenomenon in his book: THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE: AN
INVENTORY OF EFFECTS (1967). 
19 EDMUND B. HUEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY OF READING (1908) (cited in PRESSLEY &
AFFLERBACH, at 2). 
7animals through the use of tools or the opposable thumb, Kenneth Burke later announced, 
as part of his “Definition of Man,” that “man is the symbol-using animal.”20 
But there are also those who would perhaps prefer to reduce reading, if not all of 
human symbol-using, thinking and abstract behavior to the biochemistry and biophysics 
of the animal.21 Without reducing reading to chemistry, but nevertheless being mindful 
that we are animals, there remains of course much to be learned from the natural sciences 
about what reading is in the practice of law.   
Legal theories . . . need to achieve several goals if future technological and 
social challenges are to be met.  First, theories of law, justice, and human 
behavior should avoid the kind of oversimplification that can facilitate the 
construction of a pseudoscientific ideology.  . . . A legal theory should not 
make assumptions about human nature that are contradicted by what we 
know concerning hominid evolution, social organisation, or 
neurophysiology.22 
Nor should a theory of reading the law make such assumptions.  While one may apply 
natural science, such as neuropsychology, to reading or even to reading the law, more 
social science has been applied explicitly to reading in general, and to reading the law.  
Therefore the remainder of this text will be looking to the explicit applications in the 
social sciences, as well as adding ideas from the arts, rather than speculate on potential 
applications from the natural sciences. 
 
20 Kenneth Burke, Definition of Man, in PERMANENCE AND CHANGE (1935).
21 See, e.g. STEPHEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS (1997).  “Although Pinker does not aim to derive 
psychology from physics, he shares the general philosophical outlook behind such aims. . . .  [How the 
Mind Works] is massively and uncompromisingly reductive.”  John Dupre, Philosophy of Science, vol. 66, 
no. 3, September 1999, at 489. 
22 D. ELLIOTT, THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW 305 (R. D. Masters & M. 
Gruter, eds., 1992) (quoted in Hugh Brayne, Learning to Think Like a Lawyer—One Law Teacher’s 
Exploration of the Relevance of Evolutionary Psychology, in 9 International Journal of the Legal Profession 
283, 303 (2002)). 
8III. Reading, As Understood Through Social Sciences 
The social sciences, like the natural sciences, offer insights into reading, and more 
specifically, into reading in the practices of law.  Moreover, in their study of reading the 
law as human behavior, the social sciences specifically address how teachers, students 
and practitioners in the law may modify their reading behaviors in order to achieve 
articulated goals.23 While anthropology, sociology or political science might be applied 
to the study of reading, those who publish in the journals explicitly related to reading are 
most often either education specialists or psychologists.  This observation speaks directly 
to the practice of law, because “professions can be distinguished by the nature and the 
structure of their discursive field.”24 In this section, several of the theories of social 
scientists will be introduced.  Later in comparison with contributions from the arts, the 
application and conclusions of the social scientific theories will be discussed. 
Educationalists and psychologists often concentrate on reading strategies.  
Strategic reading means that a reader has expectations and a plan, may skim or outline the 
text, go immediately to the conclusion or any of many other strategies in the construction 
of meaning of a text.  Key ideas and theories that result from studying reading strategies 
are at least five: metacognitive theory,25 schema theory,26 discourse comprehension 
 
23 My literature review is meant to be representative based upon the fact that the social science studies 
selected reference, cross reference, or build upon one another; none has refuted another, and the methods 
are sufficiently similar as to be comparing apples with apples.  
24M.S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 7 (1977). 
25 See Mary A. Lundeberg, Metagognitive Aspects of Reading Comprehension: Studying Understanding in 
Legal Case Analysis, 22 Reading Res. Q. 407, 417-432; PRESSLEY AND AFFLERBACH  supra note 14, (citing 
L. Baker and A. L. Brown, Metacognitive Skills in Reading, in HANDBOOK OF READING RESEARCH 353-394 
(1984)). 
26 PRESSLEY & AFFLERBACH, supra note 14, at 87 (citing R. C. ANDERSON AND PEARSON, A SCHEMA-
THEORETIC VIEW OF BASIC PROCESSES IN READING COMPREHENSION (1984)). 
9theory,27 socio-cultural theories28 and constructive responsivity theory.29 Even the social 
science aspects of rhetoric, if rhetoric is understood as the study and practice of 
composition, might also be included.30 
Within those theories, “much of the preliminary research on differences in adult 
readers has compared cognitive31 and affective32 variables between adult readers 
classified as better or poorer. The theories that have been most often applied to specific 
professions are verbal protocols,33 including concurrent protocols,34 some of which have 
been situated in specific professions such as biology,35 engineering,36 social science,37 
27 Id. at 92. (citing T.A. VAN DIJK AND W. KINTSCH, STRATEGIES OF DISCOURSE COMPREHENSION (1983)). 
28 Socio-cultural theories include a variety of work by a variety of researchers. See also PRESSLEY &
AFFLERBACH, supra note 14, at 95-96, but of direct relevance to reading the law is that of Stanley Fish.  See 
STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?  THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE 
COMMUNITIES (Harvard University Press, 1980). 
29 PRESSLEY AND AFFLERBACH, supra note 14, at 87. 
30 Composition teachers in law, as in English departments, often tend to skew communication disciplines, 
such as rhetoric, to feature mostly only writing.  See Berger, infra, or Kunz, infra, for examples. 
31 See, e.g., L.B. Gambrell and B.S. Heatherington, Adult Disabled Readers' Metacognitive Awareness 
About Reading Tasks and Strategies, Journal of Reading Behavior 13, 215-222 (1981); V.C. Hare, Readers' 
Problem Identification and Problem Solving Strategies for High- and Low-Knowledge Articles, Journal of 
Reading Behavior 13, 359-365 (1981); N.J. Kaufman, A.L. Randlett & J. Price, Awareness of the Use of 
Comprehension Strategies in Good and Poor College Readers, Reading Psychology, 6, 1-11 (1985);
S.B.Kleitzien, Strategy Use by Good and Poor Comprehenders Reading Expository Text of Differing 
Levels, Reading Researc Quarterly, 26, 67-86 (1991), C. Spring, Comprehension and Study Strategies 
Reported by University Freshmen Who are Good and Poor Readers, Instructional Science, 14, 157-167 
(1985) (cited in Deegan, supra note 8, at 154). 
32 P.M. Fischer & H. Mandel, Learner, Text Variables, and the Control of Comprehension and Recall, in H. 
LEARNING AND COMPREHENSION OF TEXT 213-254 (Mandl, N. L. Stein, & T. Trabasso, eds.) ( Hillsdale, 
NJ: Earlbaum, 1984) (cited in Deegan, supra note 8, at 154). 
33 See, e.g., PRESSLEY & AFFLERBACH, supra note 14. 
34 See, e.g., Scott J. Burnham, supra note 17. 
35 D.Charney, A Study in Rhetorical Reading: How Evolutionists Read “The Spandrels of Marco” in 
UNDERSTANDING SCIENTIFIC PROSE 203-231 (J. Selzer, ed., 1993) (cited in Deegan, supra note 8, at 157). 
36 C. Geisler, The Thread of Narrative in Domain Knowledge: Exploring the Professionalization of 
Academic Literacy Through Expert-Novice Contrasts, Paper Presented At The Annual Meeting Of The 
American Educational Research Association, Chicago, IL, (April 1991) (cited in Deegan, supra note 8, at 
157). 
37 D. Wyatt, M. Pressley, P.B. El-Dinary, S. Stein, P.Evans, and R. Brown, Reading Behaviors of Domain 
Experts Processing Professional Articles That Are Personally Important To Them: The Critical Role Of 
Worth and Credibility Monitoring, Learning and Individual Differences 5, 49-72 (1993) (cited in Deegan, 
supra note 8, at 157). 
10
and law.38 From these theories, it has been noted that “verbal protocols are probably the 
best tool, albeit an unrefined tool, for investigating what these authors have identified as 
the meaning-making, monitoring, and evaluating processes that constitute acts of 
strategic reading.”39 Analyses of strategic reading include domain theory40 and analyzing 
distinctions between expert and novice reading practices.41 In domain theory, researchers 
observe and record differences relative to reader expertise defined as differential domain 
knowledge,42 or degree of domain knowledge.43 
In addition to the above taxonomy, the introduction of protocol analysis offered by 
cognitive psychologists Pressley and Afflerbach provides a helpful historical survey of 
some of the relevant social science.  According to Pressley and Afflerbach, the standard 
reference book for protocol analysis is Ericsson and Simon’s Protocol Analysis: Verbal 
Reports as Data, describing and explaining think-aloud methods, protocol analyses, their 
uses and misuses.44 Ericsson and Simon’s “most important conclusion is that people can 
self-report the contents of their short term meaning”45 after reading a text.  Pressley and 
Afflerbach’s protocol analysis uses verbal reports of subjects (also known as “think-aloud 
studies”), produced as the subjects read, as the data for psychological interpretation.46 
(They go back so far as to suggest that because Plato and Aristotle encouraged people to 
 
38 See generally Lundeberg, supra note 25; James F. Stratman, The Emergence of Legal Composition as a 
Field of Inquiry: Evaluating the Prospects, 60 Rev. Educ. Res. 153 (1990) (cited in Deegan, supra note 8, 
at 157). 
39 Deegan, supra note 8, at 157. 
40 See Deegan supra note 8, or Dewitz supra note 9, for examples. 
41 See McKinney, Dewitz, or Burnham for examples. 
42 See PRESSLEY & AFFLERBACH, supra note 14; Bereiter & Bird, 1985, as cited by Deegan, supra note 8, 
154. 
43 See Charney, supra note 36; Barbara Graves & Carl H. Fredericksen, Literary Expertise in the 
Description of Fictional Narrative, 20 Poetics 1, 18 (1991); Christina Haas &  Linda, Rhetorical Reading 
Strategies and the Construction of Meaning, 39 C. Comp. & Comm. 167 (1988); Lundeberg, supra note 25 
(cited by Deegan, supra note 8, at 154). 
44 PRESSLEY & AFFLERBACH, supra note 14, at 5. 
45 Id. at 7. 
46 Id. at 1. 
11
talk about what was on their minds, it may be said that think-aloud studies were extant 
even then.)47 Protocol analysis as well as the think-aloud studies upon which the protocol 
analyses are based, were used throughout the twentieth century to report on the 
processing of diverse tasks, including physics problem solving,48 student cognitions 
during instruction49 and expert and novice reading of legal texts.50 
According to Pressley and Afflerbach, by the middle of the twentieth century, 
confidence in protocol analysis declined, as introspection (a tendency of think-aloud 
subjects when describing more than short term memory) was challenged by behaviorists, 
whose theories mostly ignored cognition.51 Later however, with a renewed interest in 
reading, we began 
to make explicit what was previously implicit.  In critical reading, making the 
implicit explicit has been called a ‘concurrent protocol.’  In the protocol, we 
try to make explicit the steps we go through while undertaking a task, such as 
reading a contract.  Once we have made those steps, they can develop 
expertise in performing the task.52 
Specifically applied to legal reading, one can visit several examples.   
Metacognitive research, which is research concerned with the process of 
thinking, falls into two categories: regulation of cognition and knowledge 
about cognition.  Regulation of cognition involves consciously manipulating 
our cognitive strategies:  planning, monitoring, and checking our thinking 
processes.  Knowledge about cognition means being aware of how we 
regulate our cognitive strategies: that is, thinking about our thinking.53 
47 Id. at 1 (citing E. Boring, History of Introspection, Psychological Bulletin 50, 169-189 (1953) (citing R. 
Pritchard, The Evolution of Introspective Methodology and Its Implications for Studying the Reading 
process, Reading Psychology: An International Quarterly 11, 1-13 (1990)). 
48 Simon and Simon (1978) (cited in PRESSLEY & AFFLERBACH, supra note 14, at 4). 
49 Richard C. Anderson & P. David Pearson, A Schema-Theoretic View of Basic Processes in Reading   
Comprehension, in 1 HANDBOOK OF READING RESEARCH (P. Pearson et al., eds., 1984) (cited in PRESSLEY 
& AFFLERBACH, supra note 14, at 4). 
50 See Burnham, supra note 17, Deegan, supra note 8, and Lundeberg, supra note 25. 
51 PRESSLEY & AFFLERBACH, supra note 14, at 4. 
52 Burnham, supra note 17, at 391. Burnham then offers some “techniques” for developing expertise in the 
reading of contracts. 
53 Lundeberg, supra note 25, at 408 (citing Brown et al., (1982)). 
12
Cognitive problem-solving research, for example, has compared reading strategies 
used by expert readers versus novice readers within several disciplines including the 
study and practice of law, where Mary A. Lundeberg has compared the reading practices 
of beginning law students with those of advanced law students, law professors and 
practicing lawyers.54 These, she divided into experts and novices where legal experts 
brought to case reading their knowledge of the text type, and knowledge of case and case 
analysis strategies.  When reading and discussing legal texts, they behaved in some ways 
like expert readers.  In contrast, the legal novices, who lacked knowledge of the law, 
legal text type and case analysis strategies, sometimes behaved like good readers, and 
sometimes behaved like poor readers.55 
Lundeberg’s metacognitive study concludes that “legal reasoning in cases is often 
ill-structured because it is based on precedent and in the judge’s interpretation of the 
similarity or dissimilarity of the facts given in previous cases compared to those in the 
case at hand.”56 Lundeberg concludes that one type or another of direct instruction is 
more useful for novice learning, despite the fact that “some professors believe that 
students must flounder and experience pain to learn to think like lawyers.  These beliefs 
are not grounded in empirical evidence.”57 According to Lundeberg, “Fredericksen 
summarizes this debate about whether processes should be taught explicitly or should be 
learned by discovery.”58 He cites Doyle, who suggests that for certain groups, such as 
novices in a field of expertise, “direct instruction is more appropriate, whereas indirect 
 
54 Id. at 409 (citing Johnson, (1984)). 
55 Lundeberg, supra note 25, at 417. (citations omitted). 
56 Id. at 428. 
57 Id. at 428. (emphasis added) citing D. P. Bryden, What Do Law Students Learn? A Pilot Study. 34 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 479-506 (1984). 
58 Norman N. Frederiksen, Implications of Cognitive Theory for Instruction in Problem Solving, 54 Rev 
Educ. Res. 363, 392 (1984) (quoted in Lundeberg, supra note 25, at 417). 
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instruction is more important after basic knowledge structures and skills have been 
acquired.”59 For reading the law, this would strongly suggest that first year students 
would benefit more from direct instruction, and only thereafter benefit from indirect 
instruction, such as the Socratic method of interrogating case readings. 
The many articles and books that tell the law student “how to read a case” treat 
the process as one of what reading scholars would call “decoding” a structure (facts, 
issue, rule, application, conclusion) to produce a predictable and replicable outcome, 
thereby making law a science.  This process moves the reader from decoding to text 
structure knowledge, but ignores domain knowledge and strategic knowledge.  “The 
simple view of reading argues that reading is the product of decoding and 
comprehension.”60 According to reading scholars, all three reading knowledges are 
necessary for reading comprehension.61 In general, 
decoding a word . . . does not mean that the reader has access to its 
meaning, and legal texts are full of new terms which represent new 
concepts (e.g. situs, in intinere) and new meanings for old labels.  Reading 
comprehension is based on decoding ability, but requires three additional 
important types of knowledge—domain knowledge, text structure 
knowledge, and strategic knowledge.62 
So what must be done to include domain knowledge and strategic knowledge?  
Ericsson and Simon’s view from social science was that “conscious processing besides 
decoding is not necessary in order for readers to understand easy texts.  Active and 
strategic efforts at meaning construction only occur in reaction to more challenging 
 
59 Id.
60 Peter Dewitz, Reading Law: Three Suggestions for Legal Education, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 657 (1995-1996) 
(citing Philip B. Gough & William E. Tunmer, Reading and Reading Disability, 7 Reading & Special Educ. 




texts.”63 “Studies in areas other than law document that differences in reading 
comprehension among adult readers can be explained by differences in domain 
knowledge.  To comprehend legal text requires knowledge of case law, jurisprudence, 
legal theory, and so forth.”64 This suggests that direct instruction in the domain of law is 
necessary.  First year students, who may have a prior degree in any discipline, are not 
well-suited to learning the domain of law largely by reading excerpts from cases selected 
from a variety of jurisdictions. 
Like asking “why read?” the question “What is it to read?” redirects thinking 
away from the more common question of “how?”  When we explicitly address reading in 
the law, it would seem that we assume that like most students’ answer to the question, we 
too at least imply that a lawyer should read to get information.  Educationalist Peter 
Dewitz has noted pointedly that “after four years of undergraduate education, often from 
distinguished universities and brandishing strong grade point averages and high LSAT 
scores, first year [law] students are novices [when it comes to reading the law.]”65 If a 
lawyer regards reading as a work task, treating text as something to be “ploughed 
through,” how does that attitude toward reading affect his or her understanding of what 
law is, and consequently, his or her practices of law?  I now turn to the remainder of the 
types of knowledge that have been catalogued, and their connections to the social 
sciences. 
 
63 PRESSLEY & AFFLERBACH, supra note 14, at 14. 
64 Dewitz, supra, note 9, at 658 (citing Peter P. Afflerbach, The Influence of Prior Knowledge on Expert 
Readers: Main Idea Construction Strategies, 25 Reading Res. Q. 31, 35 (1990)); Barbara Graves & Carl H. 
Fredericksen, Literary Expertise in the Description of Fictional Narrative, 20 Poetics 1, 18 (1991). 
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The second type of knowledge necessary for reading comprehension is an 
understanding of text structure.66 “The more a reader knows about the structure or 
organization of the text, the more smoothly comprehension can proceed.”67 “Legal cases 
and legal briefs present new legal structures and a new challenge for just-graduated 
college students who have spent four years reading narratives or expository text 
structures.  Legal cases have their own unique structure . . ..”68 Therefore, textual 
analysis beyond the distillation of rules of law is needed if a student is to learn about the 
law in its social and cultural context. 
The third type of knowledge necessary for reading comprehension is 
called “strategic knowledge.”  There are three broad categories of 
strategies that readers employ as they move through a text—problem 
formation strategies, default strategies, default strategies to set 
expectations for a text.  Readers use problem formation strategies to set 
expectations for a text.  They ask themselves questions, make predictions, 
and hypothesize about the developing meaning.  . . . Default strategies 
represent summarizing, paraphrasing, retelling that readers employ to 
build an on-going sense of the text.  For most of our reading we are 
building our own representation of the text and we use both our existing 
schema and the ideas presented by the author to do so.69 
Strategic knowledge means that reading is no longer passively sounding out each 
word, one after the other, in the way that a beginning reader does, with no sense of 
direction beyond the present word.  Rather, a “reading strategy is a set of mental 
processes or tactics used by a reader to achieve a purpose.”70 “All readers use strategies; 
the use of strategies depends on the difficulty of the reading material, the maturity of the 
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reader, and the [social] context of the reading.”71 “For most of reading, strategies are used 
in a relatively unconscious manner, yet reading difficult material often makes these 
strategies conscious and intentional.”72 While strategies remain flexible,73 according to 
Peter Dewitz,  readers can generally be said to use three broad categories of strategies: 
problem-formation strategies, default strategies, and rhetorical strategies.  The impacts of 
the strategy, and consequently the analysis of a strategy, are considerable.  For example, 
“[t]he use of problem-formation strategies was found to be a better predictor of first year 
grades in law school than LSAT scores or a student’s undergraduate grade point 
average.”74 That point recalls the research that finds that “novices in a field show greater 
growth in learning when knowledge and strategies are directly taught rather than when 
students are encouraged to discover them on their own.”75 
The social sciences, especially applied psychology, though very helpful in our 
understanding of what it is to read in the practices of law, nevertheless remain focused 
upon questions of “how”?  Pressley and Afflerbach admit that even protocol analysis for 
example has constraints.  “When a subject provides verbal reports, there is the built-in 
language variation that is part of the individual’s personality and way of interacting with 
the world.  When a researcher attempts to analyze the verbal report, a separate 
worldview, vocabulary, and set of inferencing processes is put into action.”76 The 
development, transfer and maintenance of that worldview is of great interest to the study 
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of reading in the law.   While natural science got this discussion started, and social 
science developed the notions of what it is to read the law, to study the development, 
transfer and maintenance of the worldview to which Pressley and Afflerbach refer, one 
must therefore consider reading as it is understood through the arts.  With these and other 
constraints in mind, what follows are some examples of what we can learn about reading 
the law from the tradition of the arts.   
 
IV. Reading As Understood Through the Arts 
 A study of what it is to read through the arts helps to find the “Trojan horses” of 
worldview that come along with our reading practices.  Often, these hidden values and 
ideas resist analyses that ask how we know, and which can only be found when asking 
what we know or why we know it. 
To nurse that spark, common to the king, the sage, the poorest child—to 
fan, to draw up to a flame, to ‘educate’ What Is –to recognize that it is 
divine, yet frail, tender, sometimes easily tired, easily quenched under 
piles of booklearning—to let it run at play very often, even more often to 
let it rest in what Wordsworth calls “a wise passiveness,” passive—to use 
a simile of Coventry Patmore—as a photographic plate which finds stars 
that no telescope can discover, simply by waiting with its face turned 
upward—to mother it, in short, as wise mothers do their children—this is 
what I mean by the Art of Reading.77 
In what ways might we understand reading through the arts?  First, reading may 
be considered an art itself.  In 1916, Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, Professor of English 
literature at the University of Cambridge, delivered a series of twelve lectures to those 
men fortunate enough to be in lecture theaters at Cambridge and not in the theater of war 
on the continent.  It should be noted that these lectures, with the surprising title of “The 
 
77 ARTHUR QUILLER-COUCH, ON THE ART OF READING 3 (1920). 
18
Art of Reading,” were delivered only after twelve lectures entitled “The Art of Writing” 
had been previously delivered by Quiller-Couch to a similar audience.  According to 
Quiller-Couch, those lectures on writing “provoked another Professor (emeritus, learned, 
sagacious, venerable) to retort that the true business of a Chair such as this is to instruct 
young men how to read rather than how to write.  “Well be it so,” responded Quiller 
Couch, “I accept the challenge.”78 Quiller-Couch does more than help to understand the 
art of reading by instructing university students how to read.  He addresses the art of 
reading by asking “What is?” 
 Quiller-Couch’s interest is in reading as an art, not reading understood through 
the arts.  One can address the occasion of Quiller-Couch’s instruction by returning to the  
Recalling the Carnegie Foundation Report, the first recommendation for legal education 
of the seven offered is that “law schools should offer an integrated, three part curriculum 
[including] (3) exploration and assumption of the identity, values and dispositions 
consonant with the fundamental purposes of the legal profession.”79 To do so, we need to 
know what they are; in short, what the worldview of a lawyer is and how legal education 
contributes to that.  An example from contracts might help.   
Scott L. Burnham notes that when we read cases, for example, “we implicitly see 
the legal world from the perspective of litigation.  A few days into law school, 
lawyerlings think any problem is solved by a lawsuit.”80 No one told the novice students 
that the selection of the reading material alone—cases—was already a value choice, 
destined to guide the worldview of the law.  Quiller-Couch  pauses at one point in a 1916 
lecture, after discussing the pruning effect of the fires at the library of Alexandria, to say 
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“that to read all the books that have been written—in short to keep pace with those that 
are being written—is starkly impossible, and (as Aristotle would say) about what is 
impossible one does not argue.  We must select.”81 Nor did anyone tell the novice 
students that by reading cases, they were being trained that this is how problems are 
solved, how lawyers and judges behave, and how lawyers make these meanings through 
texts.  And a final “problem with reading cases is that while one of our goals is to prepare 
our students to be lawyers, there are no lawyers in the cases.82 Burnham specifically then 
notes that if instead we were to read contracts in the first year contracts class, the 
litigation worldview would change.83 
Contracts is not a litigation course but a planning course, a preventive law 
course.  The legal reasoning process used in planning is the reverse of that 
used in the case method.  In cases, the facts are a given and their legal 
significance is a variable.  In planning, the desired outcome is a given and 
the facts that will best produce it are a variable.84 
Burnham speculates that we force our study of contracts to the Procrustean bed of the 
litigation worldview by teaching the law of contracts through reading litigation cases 
about contracts, and not reading contracts themselves. 
 Yet, “in an upper-level drafting course, hours and hours of instruction on contract 
drafting skills make only a small dent in . . . sub-par reading skills,”85 observes Christina 
Kunz, based upon her experience in teaching upper level courses that do focus upon the 
drafting of contracts.  She notes that “Before students take a contract drafting course, they 
need to gain competency in reading and understating contracts at a macro level, as well as 
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reading and understanding clauses at a micro level.  This competency to read contracts 
accurately seems like an important enough skill to merit instruction in a first year 
Contracts course, rather than reserving it for only the select few students who choose to 
take a contract drafting course as an elective.”86 Contracts is just one example.  It is 
cases and the case method that dominates what it is, as law students, to read the law. 
 
A. ó Blocks: An Inherent Historical Connection of Law to Language 
 The above example serves only as a heuristic transition to the focus upon the arts.  
What remains are examples from several different arts, arranged chronologically.  This 
focus is upon the seven arts that liberated one from manual labor, found directly in, or 
arising from, the ancient Greek trivium or quadrivium first referred to as such by 
Boethius in the sixth century.  The trivium consisted of the disciplines of grammar, logic 
and rhtetoric, while the quadrivium consisted of the disciplines of arithmetic, geometry, 
music, and astronomy.   As Linda Ardito explains: 
The disciplines of the Quadrivium, together with those of the 
Trivium, came to be known collectively as the “Seven Liberal Arts,” from 
the Latin “artes liberales,” or “arts of a free man.”  This notion has its 
roots in the ancient Greek distinction between “liberal” and “vulgar” arts.  
Culture had played a vital role in ensuring that these would become art’s 
most popular classifications.   “More than any other ancient classification 
[that of ‘liberal’ and ‘vulgar’] was dependent on social conditions in 
Greece.  It was based on the fact that certain arts require physical effort 
from which others are free…It was the expression of an aristocratic 
regime and of the Greek contempt for physical work and preferences for 
activities of the mind.  The liberal or intellectual arts were considered not 
only a distinct but also a superior group.87 
86 Id.
87 Linda Ardito, Liberal Education in Greece, in GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND THE FINE ARTS 210-217 
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The first example is based upon the philologic practice of etymologic research.  
Building from the work of André Magdelain,88 who in turn had adopted the etymology of 
the Latin word lex that was proposed by Michel Bréal and Franz Skutsch, Jesper Svenbro 
finds an inherent relation between ó (lógos) and óµ (nómos).  Svenbro finds that 
the relation suggests that law, like reading, is an act of distribution or a diffusion of words 
in its most basic, physical sense.89 According to Svenbro, “The word nómos means not 
only ‘musical diffusion’ or ‘melody,’ but also ‘distribution of words.’ . . .  How can we 
explain this transition from ‘vocal distribution,’ which is not dependent upon writing (as 
reading is), to the kind of ‘distribution’ in the sense of ‘reading’ that the verb némein 
suggests?”90 Svenbro concludes his discussion of “Nómos, Exegesis, Reading” by 
stating that  
The notion of an oral distribution which is the fundamental meaning of 
nómos, corresponds to that of the ‘oral distributor’ that is implied by 
exegetés. The nómos, in the sense of reader, complements the nómos, in 
the sense of ‘reading.’  That profound complementarity, which is anything 
but gratuitous, is symptomatic of the way in which Greek culture 
developed a conception of law inseparable from its conception of reading, 
both of which set the very highest value upon the word spoken aloud.91 
Here, one can see perhaps the strongest connection imaginable between reading 
and the law—they arise from the same words!  Reading, and in particular, reading the 
law, not only accomplishes the pedestrian task of informing the reader about the 
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substance and procedure of the law, but also develops, guides and shapes the reader’s 
worldview of the law because law and reading are inherently related.92 
A second example in the tradition of the arts comes from religious studies, where 
one may understand the shift from novice to expert reader, as identified by social 
scientists above, but treated in a different way:  “In every literate society, learning to read 
is something of an initiation, a ritualized passage out of state of dependency and 
rudimentary communication.  The child learning to read is admitted into the communal 
memory by way of books, and thereby becomes acquainted with a common past which he 
or she renews, to a greater or lesser degree, in every reading.”93 Whether the initiation is 
from illiterate to literate in general, or from illiterate to literate in a special field, the 
social passage is still that of novice to expert.  So for example, in the Middle Ages,  
On the Feast of Shavuot, when Moses received the Torah from the hands 
of God, the boy about to be initiated was wrapped in a prayer shawl and 
taken by his father to the teacher.  The teacher sat the boy on his lap and 
showed him a slate on which were written the Hebrew alphabet, a passage 
from the Scriptures and the words 'May the Torah be your occupation.'  
The teacher read out every word and the child repeated it.  Then the slate 
was covered with honey and the child licked it, thereby bodily assimilating 
the holy words.  Also, biblical verses were written on peeled hard-boiled 
eggs and on honey cakes, which the child would eat after reading the 
verses out loud to the teacher.94 
Here we are reminded of the physicality of reading, and the ways in which one can be 
taught to read by ingesting words rather than memorizing them.  This physical 
relationship of the reader to the text helps to emphasize the notice we must take of the 
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various forms of transition that occur when one grows from novice to expert reader.  It 
also reinforces what a necessary, important and noteworthy step it is. 
 
B. Humanism, Scholasticism and Changing Reading Practices in   
 History 
The next example comes to us from a priest, not as part of religious studies, but 
rather of one of the seven liberal arts—grammar. 
In 1441, Jean de Westhus, priest of the Sélestat parish and the local 
magistrate, decided to appoint a graduate of Heidelberg University—Louis 
Dringenberg—to the post of director of the school.  Inspired by the 
contemporary humanist scholars who were questioning the traditional 
instruction in Italy and The Netherlands, and whose extraordinary 
influence was gradually reaching France and Germany, Dringenberg 
introduced fundamental changes. . . .  He explained the rules of grammar, 
rather than merely forcing his students to memorize them; he discarded the 
traditional commentaries and glosses, which he found did “not help 
students to acquire an elegant language,” and worked instead with the 
classic texts of the Church Fathers themselves.  By largely disregarding 
the conventional stepping-stones of the scholastic annotators, and by 
allowing the class to discuss the texts being taught . . . Dringenberg 
granted his students a greater degree of reading freedom than they had 
ever known before.95 
Like the implicit but inherent connection between reading and law, there is an 
inherent connection between law and the scholastic tradition, a tradition, developed 
mainly in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, by philosophers for whom “thinking is a 
craft with meticulously fixed laws.”96 While “[s]cholasticism proved a useful method for 
reconciling the precepts of religious faith with the arguments of human reason,” 97 it soon 
became “a method of preserving rather then eliciting ideas.”98 
95 MANGUEL, supra note 1, at 78. 




Essentially, the scholastic method consisted in little more than training the 
students to consider a text according to certain pre-established, officially 
approved criteria which were painstakingly and painfully drilled into 
them.  As far as the teaching of reading was concerned, the success of the 
method depended more on the students’ perseverance than on their 
intelligence.99 
Manguel’s description of scholasticism sounds familiarly like second year law 
study, as it is presented in the old saw repeated by American law students:  “the first year 
they scare you to death, the second year they work you to death, and the third year they 
bore you to death.”  A scholastic teacher would “copy the complicated rules of grammar 
onto the blackboard—usually without explaining them, since, according to scholastic 
pedagogy, understanding was not a requisite of knowledge.  The students were then 
forced to learn the rules by heart.  As might be expected, the results were often 
disappointing.  One of the students who attended the Sélestat Latin school in the early 
1450s, Jakob Wimpfeling, commented years later that those who had studied under the 
old system “could neither speak Latin nor compose a letter or a poem, nor even explain 
one of the prayers used at mass.”100 This raises the similar concern that legal education 
has begun to address only recently; that is, can a law student, after his or her required first 
year course in contracts, write one?  Burnham points “out to students that it is possible to 
take a law school course in Contracts and never [even] be asked to read one.”101 
I return for a moment to Quiller-Couch, or “Q,” the pseudonym under which he 
wrote.  Q went on with the preface to his lectures on “The Art of Reading” by saying that 
the first thing to be noted about the reading of English (his concern was limited to 
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English), was that “for Englishmen it has been made, by Act of Parliament, 
compulsory.”102 Q’s second observation was that in English schools and colleges and 
universities, reading had “been made, by Statute or in practice, all but impossible.”103 
Then Q delivered the third and conclusory observation to his introduction with what one 
might imagine was all the clarity and impact that an Englishman, a knight of the Empire, 
and the King Edward VII Cambridge Professor of English Literature could summon 
during a time when another culture and his were engaged in mutual violent destruction.  
That final step was: “to reconcile what we cannot do with what we must: and to that aim I 
shall, under your patience, direct this . . . lecture.”104 
It deserves to be noted that although he was lecturing during the early years of the 
first World War, the occasion for Q’s lectures, as consciously announced by him, 
included more locally, a serious change in the teaching of English literature in Britain.  
Having been the Chairman of an Education Committee several years prior105 Q speaks 
with the authority of one familiar with English education at many levels.  Despite this, in 
his lectures he advocated the overthrow of the English Tripos, a new English Literature 
curriculum, one even “worthy of this University” (Cambridge), in favor of the “spirit 
which maketh alive,”106 and offered a balanced criticism of The Education Act of 
1870.107 Q illustrates the attitude with which we read literature, and the inherent position 
that our reading attitude gives us toward the author of the text: 
It is remarkable (says he) that involuntarily we always read as superior 
beings.  Universal history, the poets, the romancers, do not in their stateliest 
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pictures . . . anywhere make us feel that we intrude, that this is for better men; 
but rather is it true that in their grandest strokes we feel most at home.  All 
that Shakespeare says of the king, yonder slip of a boy that reads in the corner 
feels to be true of himself.108 
In 1940, again when much of the world was at war, Mortimer Adler published his 
surprisingly popular How to Read A Book, the stated point of which was not a mere 
“how” but rather more important: to improve understanding when reading books, rather 
than just increasing information.  “The methods by which we learn to read not only 
embody the conventions of our particular society regarding literacy—the channeling of 
information, the hierarchies of knowledge and power—they also determine and limit the 
ways in which our ability to read is put to use.”109 
C. The Nomoi of All the Birds, Old and New 
German legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch has asserted that “sciences which 
have to busy themselves with their own methodology are sick sciences.”110 Legal 
comparativists Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz insist that legal science is precisely one 
of these sick sciences, due to the “hollowness of its traditional attitudes—unreflecting, 
self-assured, and doctrinaire . . ..”111 They offer as a remedy, the practices of 
comparative law and comparative legal study.  I would suggest that if they are correct, 
then included in their remedy is yet another practice from the tradition of the arts—the 
practice of comparative reading of the other nomoi.   
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In making the comparisons, I begin with the English language and English law.  
Unlike Q’s English language nearly one hundred years ago, law is not being attacked 
from the outside by a foreign sovereign with a foreign language that carries a foreign 
culture.  But it might be simply sick from within, according to Radbruch, Zweigert and 
Kötz, and an investigation of this sickness must be an investigation of its insides, not its 
outside surface.  Of what are law’s insides constituted?  The language and language 
relations of human beings.  Unlike the natural scientist, we lawyers have no physical 
material to call our object of study.  Instead, we learn to speak and write as the 
demonstrable services for which the practicing bar will grant us licenses and clients will 
pay our fees, largely for speaking and writing.  But at the same time, and often before we 
can speak and write, we must learn to listen and read in particular ways. 
 Why did Q claim that learning to read under the Act of Parliament and the 
University Statute was impossible?  Because the curriculum designed to get the student 
from novice to Cambridge degree, due to what was accepted as the breadth and depth of 
English literature, would require reading five to six hundred pages-worth of titles and 
authors in simple enumeration just to cover, for example, the period of 1700-1785.  
Consequently, one achieved the Cambridge degree by reading not the literature itself, but 
rather something called “the Outlines of English Literature.”112 One can quite easily 
make the analogy to the twenty-first century legal casebook, with its vast collection of 
case excerpts from various jurisdictions, and ask whether reading the words in it, in any 
way, better teaches the student to read the law than “the Outlines of English Literature” 
taught students to read English literature.  Using Robert Browning’s A Death in the 
Desert, as presented in The Aims of Literary Study by someone known as “Dr. Corson,” 
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who is described only as a “distinguished American Professor,”113 Q alights at the line 
“What Does, What Knows, What Is; three souls, one man.”  Due to their “minds being 
perverted by hate,” persons of his time had confused the order of these three souls, 
according to Q, and thereby focused upon feeding the guns and perfecting the explosives 
all in the service of What Does; all in the service of Efficiency; “no one stopping to think 
that ‘Efficiency’ is—must be—a relative term!  Efficient for what?”114 
Under what cultural form of reading do we read constitutions, statutes, cases, 
briefs, memoranda, regulations, discovery, and so on?  Q said that we read literature 
because the practice of reading literature “deals with What Is rather than What Knows,” 
the latter of which was the nature of reading for examinations.115 “Only by learning to be 
can we understand or reach, as we have an instinct to reach, to our right place in the 
scheme of things: and that, any way, all the greatest literature commands this instinct.”116 
To say that literature commands this instinct is to give life and power to the text, 
consistent with rhetoric’s notion that the text must be given equal weight with the speaker 
and the audience, when it comes to making meaning.  So when a reader employs the 
strategy of a reading for the purpose or goal of examinations, he or she is not in the 
position of being, but rather of knowing.  But being what?  Being a good person, for one 
thing.  The Roman orator Marcus Cato defined a perfect orator as vir bonus dicendi 
peritus (“a good man who speaks well.”)117 Quintillian adopted this definition as well, 
and Cicero varied the statement in its grammatical form by adding the copula “esse”
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(is).118 I would suggest that the use of “esse” in this statement helps us to understand that 
good oratory, like the good reading of which Q writes, is characterized by What Is.   
 Still chafing under the two year reading period and the examination at the end 
thereof and the consequent necessity that the students therefore read the Outline of 
literature, rather than the literature, Q notes that this practice fails to therefore address his 
framework question of What Is.  What IS literature?  What IS English literature?  Q 
proposed that “the human soul’s activities being separated, so far as we can separate 
them, into What Does, What Knows, What Is—to be such-and-such a man ranks higher 
than either knowing or doing this, that or the other: that it transcends all man’s activity 
upon phenomena . . ..”119 And if we take my point—that the stuff of law is text—then 
perhaps we too ought to be asking What IS law (as a text), rather than What Does or 
What Knows.120 Law is a set of language practices within a culture, but serves also to 
identify and maintain that culture.   
If it is true that our reading unconsciously directs our worldview, through what 
means does it do this?  In addition to providing the factoids of information that we 
consciously gather, the act of reading directs our worldview, for example, through 
defining “the various actors it addresses—the citizen, the officer, the court—and the 
relations it establishes among them.”121 And here again, one of the liberal arts can 
provide insight.  The focus upon audience and reflecting what the speaker or writer can 
learn from this focus, are practices well-known since the antique art of rhetoric, in both 
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its Greek and Latin heritages,122 and today are found in the study of rhetoric proper, but 
also in such places as reader-response theory.  To the orator’s “esse” of Cato and the 
literary “What Is” of Q, I wish to add the “is” in asking “What is reading the law?”  If 
one looks to the readers themselves to answer this question, reader response theory offers 
perspectives from both the sciences and the arts. 
Reader response theory was offered as a reaction to the model of literature 
education that predominated early in the 20th century.  In contrast to the 
perspective that texts have objective meanings, Rosenblatt (1938) proposed 
that the meanings of texts will vary somewhat from reader to reader.  This 
followed from the observation that people vary in their interpretations of the 
same text (e. g. Richards, 1929).  According to reader response theory, 
interpretive variability occurs because the meaning of a text involves a 
transaction between a reader, who has particular perspectives and prior 
knowledge, and a text, which can affect different readers in different ways 
(e.g., Beach & Hynds, 1991; Rosenblatt, 1978).  What is critical from the 
perspective of reader response theory is how the reader experiences and 
reacts to the text.123 
Perhaps the most important point of reader response theory is that it does not 
permit the meaning of a text to be understood as something completely subjective.  As 
both Rosenblatt and Eco have stated, while everyone is free to make his or her own 
interpretation of a text, there are indeed better and worse interpretations, measured by the 
degree to which an interpretation accounts for elements in a text.124 The more elements 
accounted for by an interpretation, the better the interpretation is said to be.  Rosenblatt 
balances this tendency to hierarchy with the fact that a reader’s experience with a text 
will be unique because of the “reader’s personal history, mood at the moment, and the 
state of the reader’s world at the time that the text is encountered”125 He suggested that 
literature can permit cognitive experiences that would not or could not occur to the reader 
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otherwise  Rosenblatt further asserts that literature permits readers to have cognitive 
experiences that would not occur to the reader otherwise, to experience different points of 
view, the social perspectives of different places, peoples and times, and by reflecting on 
one’s responses to literature portraying foreign events and alternative points of view, it is 
possible to learn much about oneself.126 
In order to make a slightly more expansive claim about reading the law than just 
the Anglo-American traditions, it will be worthwhile even if briefly, to consider some 
others.  For the illustrative purposes of comparing reading practices, I shall follow the 
point made by the legal comparativists, Konrad Zweigert and Heinrich Kötz in their oft-
cited treatise on the subject, Introduction to Comparative Law.127 Among the legal 
families that Zweigert and Kötz distinguish in this important work for comparative law, 
these four remain paramount.  Zweigert and Kötz note that their categories of legal 
families vary only slightly128 from that of the older, and also highly-influential work of 
Arminjon, Nolde and Wolff.129 Thus, Zweigert and Kötz divide the world’s legal 
families among the Romanistic family, the Germanic family, the Nordic Family, and the 
Common Law family.  Zweigert and Kötz must acknowledge that this is a Euro-centric 
set of categories, and that Chinese, Japanese, Islamic and Hindu law differ considerably 
from these families.  Those legal families and legal reading practices are beyond the 
scope of this article, however.   
Good comparison is of course more than mere juxtaposition.  In comparing legal 
families, one must establish a method of comparison.  If that comparison is founded 
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upon comparing legal texts, then what one is really practicing is comparative reading 
when comparing legal families.  Even without explicitly addressing legal comparison as 
a reading practice, Zweigert and Kötz note that any comparison of legal systems 
requires, as one of the comparativist’s steps, establishing a syntax and a vocabulary.  In 
connecting Zweigert and Kötz’s method for legal comparison with what Q tells us about 
reading, we are reminded by Emerson that “Great literature never condescends.  That 
what yonder boy in a corner reads of a king is happening to him.”130 So when we read 
the law, what is happening to us?  Do we identify with a perpetrator of a civil or criminal 
wrong, and answer for him, as with Althusser’s man on the street who, interpellated, 
volunteers himself as subject when he turns in response to the police office calling “hey, 
you”?131 Do we identify with the author who is trying to legislate, adjudicate, mediate or 
persuade (as in the case of an advocate’s brief or pleading)?  While discussing reading 
for the purpose of examinations, Q revisits the practices of university students being 
examined in Bologna, Paris and Oxford.  At Bologna, which Q notes being famous for 
civil law, it would seem that the reader was encouraged to identify himself with his 
teacher as a father, and not the author of the text.  “[T]he process of graduation—of 
admission to the jus docendi, ‘right to teach’—consisted of two parts, the Private 
Examination and the Public (conventus) . . ..”132 First the candidate would be examined 
by his own Doctor privately to determine if he was ready to be put forward.  Then “the 
candidate appeared before the assembled College and was assigned by one of the 
Doctors present two passages (puncta) in the Civil or Canon Law as the case might be.  
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He then retired to his house to study the passages, in doing which it would appear that he 
had the assistance of the presenting Doctor.”133 Later in the examination, “[o]ther 
Doctors might ask supplementary of Law (which they were required to swear that they 
had not previously communicated to the candidate. . . .  With a tender regard for the 
feelings of their comrades at this ‘rigorous and tremendous Examination’ . . . the Statutes 
required the Examiner to treat the examinee as his own son.”134 In this context, when 
asking “what is reading the law?” for an examination, the reflective candidate would 
reply that it was pleasing his father. 
Today, in the German civil law system, one begins the process of reading the law by 
interpreting (Auslegung) words in legislation.135 According to Reinhold Zippelius, in 
Juristische Methodenlehre,136 “The ‘classic’ interpretation theory (Auslegungstheorie) of 
Savigny held it to be the job of interpretation ‘to place one’s self in thought from the 
position of the legislator, whose occupation one artificially repeats.’ Thus would 
interpretation be ‘the reconstruction of the law’s inherent thinking.’”137 Returning for a 
moment to what Dewitz might call a “rhetorical strategy,” the civil law reader then 
entertains whether different real persons or different real acts may be categorized the 
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same and calls the process “subsumption,”138 based upon the principle from formal 
logic.139 
Even in the formal deductive process described by Zippelius, readers are reminded 
that what might appear to be a matter of fitting an act neatly into a formal logical pattern 
known as “subsumtion” is first an act of interpretation known as “Auslegung,” an act 
which requires facility with all three of Dewitz’ strategies of reading.  “In order to assess 
whether the application of a legal provision or norm is possible in a particular case, one 
must interpret the relevant provision/norm and establish whether the set of facts involved 
can be subsumed under it.”140 Students of German law learn to read the German Civil 
Code (Bürgerlichesgesetzbuch or BGB) in this manner.141 How many students have 
formed their legal worldview reading the Code this way?  The BGB was adopted in 1896, 
and has extensively influenced many other civil systems, including those of Switzerland, 
Austria and Japan. 
 By comparison, the French Civil Code is the basis of the civil law education in 
France. As it is older and to a certain extent less systematic than the German BGB, the 
education is rather based on the systematic presentation of the law as it is made by the 
professors than on a textual approach. In addition to civil law, French students learn the 
law through the reading and study of general principles of criminal law (droit pénal) and 
public law (droit public, droit administratif).  As is more typically thought of common 
law, these general principles of the French public law are mainly based on case 
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precedents since these principles were not initially codified as was the French private 
law. Accordingly, French students have to learn by heart the case precedents (together 
with the date of each ruling) as a substitute for codified legal rules. 
 As opposed to German universities, the law faculties of French universities 
practice a different approach in the teaching of law:  students are taught law on the basis 
of “judicial decision comments” (commentaire d’arrêt) and theoretic essays 
(dissertations) which require the capacity to situate a judicial decision in its right legal 
context, on the one hand, and systematically to synthesize the rules applicable to a 
theoretic question of law, on the other hand. This situating of judicial decisions requires 
direct instruction in domain knowledge from the beginning.  Teaching on the basis of 
case studies (cas pratique) is rather unusual, at least during the first years of studies.142 
Yet for the student of French law, the way of reading and applying the law is 
similar to the German one. Students of French law learn to read the law on the basis of 
the deductive (categorical) syllogism (syllogisme déductif), resulting in applying a three 
step process: (1) the major (la majeure), that is, the provisions of the law, (2) the minor 
(la mineure), that is, the facts involved, (3) the conclusion, that is, whether the facts meet 
the provisions of the law. 
Zweigert and Koetz remind us that the Scandavian family of law, for comparative 
lawyers, must be treated as a separate family of law.143 What is reading in the practice of 
law in Sweden?  Swedish law students are told for instance, that it is “not necessary to 
neatly identify what is ratio decidendi on the one hand and obiter dictum on the other.  
This distinction as such can be very useful for the interpretation of Swedish court 
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decisions, too, but its significance is different, its main usefulness not being a tool to 
distinguish between binding and non-binding argument but an instrument to attribute 
greater or lesser persuasive importance to different arguments in one judgement.”144 
Further, when one asks where “can one look up the texts of Swedish laws and 
regulations?”145 one is told that “The answer to this questions depends on the character of 
the norm, i.e. as constitutional Act, ordinary Act, ordinance or statutory instrument, and 
the answer further depends on whether the officially recorded text is needed or whether 
any other reliable publications is sufficient,”146 which again demonstrates that prior 
domain knowledge is necessary for the lawyer to begin to find the rule of law for a given 
problem. 
 Having made this brief visit to the ways of reading advocated in these legal 
families, we find some connections in the act of reading itself.  Semiotician and novelist 
Umberto Eco asserts that learning to read is more important than learning to write.147 
This is the case because in reading a text, a reader gives it meaning, without which it is 
not a text, but just ink on paper.  Thus, the act of reading can properly be said to produce 
a text.  We produce texts by reading them.  
In the act of reading there are two texts, the text provided by the author in 
print and the text we build in our head.  Our internal paraphrasing and 
summarizing are the default strategies we use to build this internal text. . . 
. When we read about a Queen Anne chair, our abstract chair schema 
gives us the general structure and function of a chair, and the text makes 
the structure specific to Queen Anne chairs—unless you grew up in a 
Danish Modern home.148 
144 Hans-Heinrich Vogel, Sources of Swedish Law, in INTERNATIONELL KONKURS—OCH ACKORDSRÄTT 61 
(Mchael Bogdan, ed., Institutet för Rättsvetenskapling Forskning [CLXIX] Stockholm:  Norstedts Juridik, 
1984). 
145 Id. at 49. 
146 Id.
147 UMBERTO ECO, THE ROLE OF THE READER: EXPLORATIONS IN THE SEMIOTICS OF TEXTS (1984). 
148 Dewitz, supra note 9, at 659-660 (citing Deegan, supra note 8; PRESSLEY & AFFLERBACH, supra note 
14; Janice A. Dole et al., Reading Comprehension Instruction, 61 Rev Educ Res. 239, 242-49 (1991); Rand 
37
That is to say, as Rosenblatt and others observed, it is the audience—listener or reader—
who makes meaning from the word. “[W]hen readers construct meaning, they do so in 
the context of a discourse situation, which includes the writer of the original text, other 
readers, the rhetorical context for reading, and the history of the discourse.”149 In law, 
we teach writing as the instrumental act that mobilizes the law.  But much of the practice 
of law, and even more of the study of law (which must be understood as more than 
learning to mimic the practices of the practice of law) is fundamentally if not initially 
concerned with reading.  Social science has recognized this observation when studying 
student readers of the law: 
There are a number of reasons why law students were selected as the subjects 
for this study of individual differences in strategic reading.  First, studying 
and practicing the law essentially involves text interpretation and production.  
Words are tools for lawyers, who must be able to forge words into 
consequential discourse.  Learning to be a lawyer entails more than thinking 
like a lawyer, it necessitates being able to read and write like a lawyer.150 
I would go further.  If words are an end for anyone, they are so for a lawyer.  Like a 
teacher or a poet who cannot be sure what an audience will make of his or her words, and 
who does not have the material world to study and use, as the natural scientist would, 
lawyers have as a product, words. 
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D. Reading, Writing and A Rhetoric? 
 A U.S. law school curriculum typically includes at least one course called 
something like “Legal Writing and Research.”  After all, to be a successful lawyer, one 
must be able to write pleadings, write briefs, write memoranda, write letters, write 
contracts, write wills and so on.  Law schools also offer substantive courses in contracts, 
estates, and so forth.  And of course there is the recurrent old saw by which students are 
admonished to “think like lawyers.”  Researching, writing and thinking like a lawyer are 
explicitly expressed in the curriculum.  Implied in that expression is the linear 
progression that writing begins with research.  Research—at least etymologically—ought 
to begin with searching, and how else do people working with texts search than by 
reading?  But reading is neither explicitly nor independently151 addressed in the 
curriculum.  Even in the odd circumstance when reading is explicitly addressed, as when 
legislatures draft statutory interpretation legislation, we pay too little explicit attention to 
it.  Why should we?  Is legal reading any different from other reading?  Of course it is!  
First of all, for many students of the law, as noted by Ruth Ann McKinney, the 
experience of reading primary texts is a new type of text that requires a new type of 
reading.152 Moreover, reading the law is not just a means to an end, as one suggests when 
he or she says that the purpose of reading is to “get information,” and that the method of 
good reading is to get information “efficiently.”   
 A variety of scholars—from legal writing teachers to educational theorists—use 
the term “rhetoric” in their work.  Since Plato mounted his campaign against the sophists, 
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the term is often tarnished with a pejorative connotation.  Plato himself exercised little 
trust for the discipline in his Gorgias dialogue, but by the time he arrived at the Phaedrus 
dialogue some years later, he had mellowed on the art, and concludes the Phaedrus by 
offering a possibility for its just use.  Later, Plato’s student Aristotle, defined the term in 
his work entitled Rhetoric: “Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any 
given case the available means of persuasion.  This is not a function of any other art.”153 
Aristotle’s definition would suggest that rhetoric is an analytical tool, but his definition 
says nothing of the practice.  Thus, helpfully, Kenneth Burke points out that unlike 
criminology, which is capable by label of distinguishing the practitioner (criminal) from 
the student (criminologist), rhetoric has no such distinctive denotations.  So one must 
recognize the connotations.  Thus he calls the practice of rhetoric “rhetoric 1,” and the 
study of rhetoric “rhetoric 2.”  But perhaps most important for the present discussion is 
“rhetoric 3,” added by Trevor Melia and James E. McGuire.  Rhetoric 3, as presented by 
Melia and McGuire, refers to a “worldview.”154 It is a worldview not offered by Plato in 
his Gorgias dialogue, nor by Aristotle in his Rhetoric, but by Gorgias himself in the 
extant fragments that we have from his work, “On Nature.”155 Gorgias’ rhetorical 
worldview ranges over three possible connections of language to the world. First, it is 
possible that truth does not exist.  Second, he posits, truth exists but we cannot know it.  
Finally he asserts that truth exists, we can know it, but we cannot communicate it.  Any 
of the three formulations produce a worldview in which the creation of meaning from text 
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is not a function of tethering text to things in the world, but rather to abstractions created 
by language or even to language itself. 
 We can then attach rhetoric-as-worldview to the use of the term “rhetoric” in 
theories of reading.   “Rhetorical strategies go beyond the text itself as the reader 
comments upon and evaluates the ideas read.”156 Dewitz quotes Haas and Flowers: 
“Rhetorical strategies take a step beyond the text itself.  They are concerned with 
constructing a rhetorical situation for the text, trying to account for author’s purpose, 
context and effect on the audience.”157 This is far, far different than simply determining 
something as prevalent in legal study, but so unaccepted by psychologists, philosophers, 
historians, literary theorists, rhetoricians and classicists as “legislative intent.”158 
Moreover, the analysis of strategies has massive practical appeal.  If rhetoric can itself be 
a worldview, and we use it in that sense when Dewitz talks of “rhetorical strategies” in 
the legal reader, or Berger talks about the New Rhetoric of legal reading when it is 
coupled with writing, what result might obtain? 
 And for the novice reader of the law, who lacks extensive background knowledge 
and will find it difficult to determine importance in legal cases, rhetorical strategies can 
be that much more important, as the novice relies upon text-based strategies.159 
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E. From Q to QC: Lessons from Literature for Law160 
Legal composition experts have used the theories and practices of rhetoric to 
enable a student to see how legal writing and reading do more than acquire and produce 
information.  Using a rhetorical worldview, “reading is a process for constructing 
meaning, not just an Easter egg hunt to find it.”161 The construction of meaning is not 
limited to constructing a lexicon of the referents of words, nor to adjusting that lexicon to 
the psychological speculations of the writer’s intent.  Reading, in great addition to the 
pedestrian purpose of getting information, is in fact constitutive of legal practice, not 
simply preliminary to the practice.  In recollecting his own history of learning to read, 
Alberto Manguel recalls his childhood in Buenos Aires, and reflects upon the evidence of 
reading practices that he and his schoolmates left behind.  “Centuries from now, if some 
scrupulous librarian were to exhibit those notebooks as precious objects in glass cases, 
what would a visitor discover? . . .  From the identical glosses the visitor might learn that 
we were taught to read not for pleasure or for knowledge but merely for instruction.  In a 
country where inflation was to attain a monthly 200 per cent, this was the only way to 
read the fable of the grasshopper and the ant.”162 
The communicative function of the law, on so many occasions, is to codify that 
which is left open to repeated and continuous debate in other circles of life.  For instance, 
if we are deciding for which candidate to vote or which restaurant to choose, and my 
interlocutor says “I have heard from my friend that candidate Schiller is good” or that 
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“my sister told me that restaurant Schwann is bad,” I cannot say “objection; hearsay” and 
expect a third person, such as a judge, who is backed by force, such as the police, thereby 
to stop my interlocutor and remove her statement from consideration in making the 
decision.  So too is it the case with codification when reading the law.  The law itself, in 
places like the federal and state rules of statutory interpretation, codifies how we are to 
read. Unlike Q, who advocated not reading literature according to the Education Act, I 
would advocate that we consider even more thoroughly the explicit rules of legal reading 
found in places like Statutory Construction Acts, and even more so, the implicit rules of 
legal reading that we acquire through such norms as learning to “think like a lawyer.”   
Try handing a piece of legislation or a judicial decision—or worse, a code of 
regulations—to someone not trained in the law, and they will have difficulty making very 
much meaning of it, or at least they will make a meaning of it so different than anyone 
trained in the law, that it might well be of no use in legal practices.  And here it becomes 
important to note that in the academy, other scholars, such as political scientists, read 
legal texts, usually court decisions, and make meaning from them.  The result is often 
played out as a battle between the lawyers and political scientists as to whose reading of 
the text is the right one, or the one that matters, or the one that has practical effect or 
influence.  Thus if one is convinced that it is worthwhile to look at how lawyers learn to 
read law, and how legal education trains them to do so, one must look more for 
implications than explications, because rarely do we address “learning to read.”  A 
complementary concern is that lawyers read non-law texts as law texts because it is the 
only, or largest volume of text that she has ever read, thus putting her unconsciously in 
the practice of reading all texts as though they are law. 
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To bring to conscious articulation how we learn to read the law, and continue to 
read law, we might begin with the more basic question of how we learn to read in 
general. “It is often argued that reading is reading, meaning that once one has acquired 
good reading skills any text is equally accessible.  A significant amount of research now 
exists to refute that claim.”163 Indeed, the opposite is true; each genre we read requires 
the use of special knowledge plus the tools or strategies to use that knowledge. 
When I poll students with the question “Why read?” the most common answer is 
consistently “to get information.”  Which contexts influence this answer?  Is it the age of 
the person being asked?  The age in which he or she lives?  The place in which he or she 
lives?  Would Homer answer this way?  Would Pa Chin or Azar Nafisi?  What does it 
mean to read to be informed?  If we allow the suggestion that the act of reading may be 
studied scientifically, to whom or what should we look to understand reading? 
Composition scholars report that students “expect knowledge or information to be given 
to them rather than taking an active role in obtaining or shaping that knowledge.”164 
All agree that the first reason given by students is “to get information.”  That answer is 
followed by something like “to obtain knowledge,” which  is offered with only blurry 
distinctions from “to get information.”  Some will admit to reading for pleasure.  But the 
fourth answer, arrived at by only a very few students, is to form a world view.  I suspect 
that the worldview formed by reading started long before law school, and is perhaps often 
unfortunately related most closely to students’ previous university reading experiences.  
The American Bar Association and the American Association of Law Schools report that 
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the majority of students entering law school have studied some form of business as 
undergraduates.  For reading the law, this is a problem because according to reading and 
education scholars, “The most important factor that affects comprehension ability is the 
knowledge that the reader brings to the page.”165 Thus, it is not only whether a reader has 
sufficient comprehension to say that he or she understands the text with enough comfort 
to read on, but what the nature of that comprehension is that the reader has brought to the 
legal page.  Many different comprehensions could be sufficient for the reader to feel that 
he or she comprehends and can move on.  How is the study and practice of law shaped 
differently because the particular comprehension that the reader brings is from the study 
and practices of business as an undergraduate?  In distinction, Similarly, Richard H. 
Weisberg would say that learning a worldview from the reading of law can help us to 
arrive at justice.166 But this justice requires a reading that is capable of translation, not 
just definition. 
 Some may ask why one would go to the arts of literature or rhetoric for 
learning about reading, rather than asking neurobiologists or brain physiologists?  The 
answer is that when studying the act of reading, it is not just the mechanics of the brain 
that interest us, but how we make meaning—the socio-psychological aspect of meeting 
the text.  As Linda L. Berger notes, “The ‘meaning-making view of writing appeals to 
those who view reading and writing as ways to live, not just as ways to make a living.”167 
Similarly, Kennth Burke reminds us that when it comes to reading, there is no pure 
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literature.  Even reading belletristic literature, for Burke, is medicine.  Thus he concludes 
in his philosophy of literary form, that “literature is equipment for living.”168 Moreover, 
the “search” that forms the basis of “re-search” is the act of reading.  The search was a 
reading search, a visual act.  It was not the manipulation of the material world in a 
controlled experiment the way a natural scientist may search or research.  When we as 
lawyers research, we read again what has been read before and reinterpret what 
previously has been interpreted.  Reading, reading, reading.  That’s what we do—it is 
constitutive of the practice of law.  What does it mean for one who is a student of the law 
to “study” the law, if it does not mean to read it and re-read it?  And what practicing 
lawyer ever can afford to stop studying the law?  In British usage, one is still said to be 
reading law” in reference to the formal study of law at the university.  And due to the 
post-graduate status of professional schools, in the United States one cannot say she or he 
is “majoring” in law at the university.  At the time before law school was mandatory in 
order for a student to sit for the bar examination in the United States, one had the option 
to sit for the bar exam having either studied the law in law school, or having “read” the 
law.  Why take our cue from literature?  If law is constituted by language then we ought 
to use the study of language as being constitutive of the study of law.  It need not be a 
study of language from the perspective of literature.  It could just as well be from the 
perspective of the philosophy of language, linguistics, rhetoric, classics, modern 
language, or comparative language. 
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Some of the study of legal reading, especially the empirical study, has been 
conducted by legal writing teachers, who, although they have produced excellent 
empirical and theoretical work, have often connected the understanding of reading to its 
instance of being coupled with writing.169 
Furthermore, “We are told that, as with languages in comparative linguistics, legal 
systems are to be put into families on the basis of similarities and differences.”170 To 
complete the language connection begun by Zwiegert and Kötz from the discipline of 
comparative law here, one must note that “similarities” and “differences” are in fact two 
of the three (the third being degree) major parts of the well-known rhetorician’s common 
topic of comparison.171 
F. Explicit Rules of Reading 
“Following the scholastic method, students were taught to read through orthodox 
commentaries that were the equivalent of our potted lecture notes.”172 The law itself is 
not silent on how to read the law.  The US Code and many states’ statutes173 all have 
early sections telling us some explicit rules and ideas for how to read what follows.  Why 
do we not make more use of them?  After all, they are not optional—they are the law of 
reading the law!  I would suggest that perhaps we do not pay close attention to those 
explicit rules, nor the very idea that there are rules because when we read those other 
things mentioned above—the newspaper, e-mail, magazines, novels—there is not a set of 
required reading rules that goes along with them.  And that, to me, is evidence that we 
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use our reading practices from those areas as the ways in which we read the law.  Are 
there also assumptions that reading first of all is passive and second of all derivative?  
Insofar as the reader is making or co-producing the meaning of the text, he or she does so 
by the experience and knowledge he or she brings to it.  That bringing is not at all a 
derivative act.  Moreover, how one reads the law from culture to culture, and from legal 
culture to legal culture, has different explicit rules that are enormously telling as to the 
basic thought process that one takes to a particular culture’s law. 
Outside the law, classicists, archaeologists and historians, among others, also have 
rules for how one is to read particular texts.  These too, are good places to look by 
comparison to see that one needs to state, if not justify, particular goals to be achieved by 
reading a set of texts in order to justify creating and enforcing rules of how one reads 
those texts. 
 
G. Implicit Rules of Reading 
In addition to the explicit rules of reading, there are powerful implicit rules of 
reading.  Literary critics and scholars can spend their entire careers mapping out the 
conventions, conceits and fictions of belletristic writing.  In the law, we also have an 
entire history of “fictions,” and not in a simple, derogatory or pejorative sense, but as a 
practical solution to problems that would otherwise have absurd results under a 
Procrustean law. 
Add here the three ways of reading that are settled upon by legal scholars: Within 
American constitutional theory, as taught to students of American law, it has become 
relatively standard to treat reading in three ways: textualism, historicism (also known as 
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originalism and including arguments from the intent of the framers), and pragmatism, 
which serves as a sort of weak liberalism.174 This typology is repeated in the texts that 
hold themselves out as being representative enough to introduce a student to the field of 
constitutional law as well.175 Of course one must admit that “it might be that strategies 
effective in one context (reading literature) might not be efficient in another (reading 
law).”176 In addition, the social science researchers themselves admit limits on the 
warrant of their conclusions, based largely upon inherent difficulties in their methods.177 
Moreover, as Deegan points out, and Dewitz reiterates, rhetorical strategies, for example, 
“can be dangerous, especially when readers attempt to comment on or evaluate the ideas 
in a text before they understand them.”178 
V. Conclusions:  Reading Law in the Danish Modern Home 
Peter Dewitz offers the striking analogy for the context of a reading strategy—the 
abstract schema—from the world of furniture.  We can understand something about 
Queen Anne chairs because we have an abstract schema of chairs already in mind as we 
begin that particular reading.  This abstract default schema could, however, be thrown off 
if our sense of chairs is quite different, based upon our social context—the Danish 
modern home, suggests Dewitz.  What does this mean for reading law?  What 
assumptions do we make about the dominant abstract schema that might not apply to the 
no less valid legal equivalent of the Danish modern home?  According to James Boyd 
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White, “[o]ne way to think of the relation a text establishes with its reader—and a way 
that connects the textual community constituted in the text with the process of reading 
it—is to think of the text as creating an Ideal Reader, the version of himself or herself that 
it asks each of its readers to become.”179 White gives as examples of the Ideal Reader, 
that person who grabs a musket when the text is a call to arms, or buys a particular 
cologne and no other upon reading an advertisement.  But for law, he then most helpfully 
alights at the literary text:   
[T]he Ideal Reader of a great work of literature, on the other hand, may 
feel that her whole language, and the motives it expresses and stimulates, 
are thrown into question, or she may find her sympathies extended in ways 
she could not have imagined, or she may discover herself holding for a 
moment contrasting perceptions in her mind, both of them true despite 
their incompatibility.  This is one way to describe the way texts teach.180 
This description of the reader meeting literature would seem far more like the reader 
meeting law than it does like the Ideal Reader’s call to arms or to consume.   
Many questions for further reflection remain.  “Do you swear to tell the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth?” we ask witnesses, litigants and anyone else giving 
testimony that is to be accepted as evidence in a court of law.  Even if the intention of the 
witness giving testimony, cemented by this oath, is to tell the truth, how does he or she 
know what the whole truth could possibly be?  What must be included?  If we are 
paleontologists, must we begin with the dinosaurs to explain what I saw at the bank 
robbery last week?  Obviously not, yet although the law is all about making a codified 
process of all knowledge, it does not give the witness guidelines as to what the “whole” 
truth is.  That is accomplished through cultural and linguistic construction.  As Q reminds 
us: 
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So you see, Gentlemen, while pleading before you that Reading is an Art—
that its best purpose is not to accumulate Knowledge but to produce, to 
educate, such-and-such a man—that ‘tis folly to bite off more than you can 
assimilate—and that with it, as with every other art, the difficulty and the 
discipline lie in selecting out of vast material, what is fit, fine, applicable—I 
have the great Francis Bacon himself towering behind my shoulder for 
patron.181 
There is the legal presupposition of relevance, but that works only to keep out that 
which is irrelevant, not to prescribe that which is relevant.  Likewise with materiality. 
Materiality and relevance are legal terms of art—how can a lay witness operate with 
those guidelines when he or she is answering questions?  There must be some other sense 
of “whole” truth as well for these other persons.  So too with legal reading when it comes 
under the banner of “research.”  How does one know what to read, where to begin 
reading, and where to stop reading? 
So will a better understanding of reading produce better lawyers, better judges, or 
even better law?  Yes, it will.  The skills of a lawyer are a set of socio-linguistic practices, 
comprised of reading, listening, writing and speaking.  It is worth reiterating: 
“Professions can be distinguished by the nature and the structure of their discursive 
field.”182 First, it will enable the student and lawyer to be a better lawyer in a technical 
sense, because for example “effective use of the problematizing strategy, appeared in this 
study to be a better predictor of first-year academic performance than either LSAT scores 
or undergraduate GPAs.”183 Second, a focus upon reading skills, rather than things like 
pseudo-accounting skills, just might focus the lawyer’s attention on the ideal of justice 
that everyone liked to talk about so much when constitutions were written,184 but which 
 
181 QUILLER-COUCH, supra note 77, at 25. 
182 M.S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 7 (1977). 
183 Deegan, supra note 8, at 166. 
184 See WHITE, supra note 121. 
51
becomes an object of cynical scorn already by the third year of law study.185 First year 
students learn their new practice of reading the law while being “told to set aside their 
desire for justice.  They are warned not to let their moral concerns or compassion for the 
people in the cases they [have read and] discuss cloud their legal analysis.”186 That is the 
worldview that students tacitly learn when learning to read the law.  That is unlikely to be 
what we intend when we insist that law students need to learn to “think like lawyers?”  
Social scientists note that “legal educators profess to build minds rather than fill them.  
Indeed they claim not to teach rules of law, but rather, to teach students how to think like 
lawyers.”187 Third, educationalists and reading researchers in psychology report that 
instruction in reading can provide a student with confidence.  “Given the difficulties 
faced by reading legal text, most law students attributed their problems to themselves and 
not to the text.”188 As evidence of that assertion,“debriefing interviews [with law 
students] revealed a deep insecurity and anxiety about reading . . ..  It was interesting that 
when asked why they volunteered for this study, many of the participants replied they 
thought they might be able to talk to someone who understood their perceived, unvoiced, 
but very real concerns about reading.”189 A study of reading can help a student to 
recognize that alone by the act of reading, he or she is maintaining a worldview.  That 
same Professor Emeritus of whom Q was writing above, reminds us that within Christian 
art history, “there are numerous representations of Mary holding a book in front of the 
Child Jesus, and of Anne teaching Mary, but neither Christ nor His Mother was depicted 
as learning to write or actually writing; it was the notion of Christ reading the Old 
 
185 Id.
186 Sullivan, supra note 5, at 6. 
187 Lundeberg, supra note 25, at 409 citing Bryden, supra note 57. 
188 Dewitz, supra note 9, at 665. 
189 Deegan, supra note 9, at 168. 
52
Testament that was considered essential to make the continuity of the Scriptures 
explicit.”190 
By the time of his death in 1477, Louis Dringenberg had given his students in the 
small French town of Sélestat “a greater degree of reading freedom than they had ever 
known before” by dismissing scholasticism.  To do so, he had to establish “the basis for a 
new manner of teaching children to read . . ..”191 While we may not be prepared to take 
such a complete and drastic action as Dringenberg, a change in attitude toward reading is 
already a change.   
The passage from the scholastic method to more liberated systems of 
thought brought another development.  Until then, the task of a scholar 
had been—like that of a teacher—the search for knowledge, inscribed 
within certain rules and canons and proven systems of learning; the 
responsibility of the teacher had been felt to be a public one, making texts 
and their different levels of meaning available to the vastest possible 
audience, affirming a common social history of politics, philosophy and 
faith. . . .  [With the humanist perspective] the students eventually reacted 
by circumscribing the act of reading to their own intimate world and 
experience and by asserting their authority as individual readers over 
every text.192 
Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch called for the overthrow of the tripos.  To accomplish 
the justice called for by James Boyd White193 or Richard H. Weisberg,194 reading 
practices and the values and substance they bring, must be made conscious.  If we do not, 
there is a risk.  “While learning one’s way around with language involves a capacity to 
cope with . . . seldom noticed ambiguities, there seems to be a high degree of intolerance 
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to talking-about-them; an intolerance that at least promotes the persuasive-manipulative 
potentials of their use.”195 
195 WALTER PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 23 (1972). 
